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Criminal Law
CRIMINAL LAW-

COMMENT-

RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT

ORGANIZATIONS ACT (RICO)-APPLICATION OF
CIRCUIT.
I. INTRODUCTION

RICO

IN THE THIRD

In response to a report from the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, which revealed the enormous
impact of organized crime in America,' Congress, through its commerce
clause power, 2 enacted the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (Act). 3
Title IX 4 of the Act, known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 5 provides for civil and criminal actions against persons accused of the commission of certain proscribed activities. 6 Congress
intended RICO to provide the government with additional means to combat
7
organized crime.
This comment will examine judicial interpretations of key sections of
RICO as well as the constitutionality of the statute. Emphasis will be placed
on decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
because of the number of important decisions of first impression within that
circuit.
II. RICO

AND ITS JUDICIAL GLOSS

A. Background
Prior to the promulgation of RICO, federal prosecution of organized
crime was limited to prosecutions for violations of federal laws of limited
applicability." Despite these efforts, organized crime continued to grow in
1. See generally N. PHILCOX, AN INTRODUCTION TO ORGANIZED CRIME 3-7 (1977). While
organized crime is virtually impossible to define, a presidential commission has defined it as "a
society that seeks to operate outside the control of the American people and their governments." Id. at 3, quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 187-200 (1967).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. For the text of the commerce clause, see note 37 infra.
3. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (codified in part
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1976)).
4. Title IX was originally introduced by Senators McClellan and Hruska as a separate bill.
S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1976). For a good overview of RICO, see Atkinson, "Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations," 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68: Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM. LAw & C. 1 (1978).
6. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-64.
7. Section 1 of the Act provides in part:
It is the purpose of this Act . . . to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by
establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 941.
8. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1314 (1976) (making unlawful the use of the mails for fraudulent
purposes); id. § 1343 (making unlawful the use of wire, radio, or television communications for

fraudulent purposes). Both § 1341 and § 1343 provide for a fine of not more than $1,000 and/or
imprisonment of not more than five years. Id. §9 1341, 1343. Neither section, however, provides
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the United States, 9 becoming what Congress found to be a "highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of
dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct." 10 Congress enacted
RICO in an effort to control the influence of crime in America."
Because
Congress also found that organized crime had increasingly used its money
and power "to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business ... and our democratic processes," 12 RICO was designed to eliminate the effects of crime on
business enterprises engaged in interstate commerce.

13

B. The RICO Statute
By rendering unlawful certain activities ordinarily engaged in by mem-

bers of organized crime, and by providing civil remedies for such activities, 14 RICO expands the means by which organized crime in the United
States can be combatted. Essentially, RICO precludes any person from infil-

for civil remedies. Id. See also id. §§ 1951-55 (prohibiting the interference of interstate commerce by threats or violence, foreign transportation in aid of racketeering, and interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia); id. §§ 872-74 (providing criminal penalties only for extortion, blackmail, and kickbacks).
9. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice
found that the growth of organized crime was due to the lack of resources to enforce the law,
the failure of federal and state officials to work together effectively, and the lack of total commitment to reaching a solution. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LA\V ENFORCEMENT AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 198200 (1967) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].

Congress found that organized crime continued to spread because of "defects in the
evidence-gathering process . . . and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1(5), 84 Stat. 941.
10. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 941. It has
been estimated that organized crime grosses between seven and fifty billion dollars a year.
REPORT, supra note 9, at 189.
11. See McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S.30) Or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil
Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 141 (1970).

12. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1(3), 84 Stat. 941.
13. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969).
14. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951-55 (1976) (criminal sanctions for gambling include a fine of
not more than $10,000 oi imprisonment for not more than 20 years or both); id §§ 471-73
(criminal sanctions for counterfeiting and forgery include a fine of not more than $5,000 or
imprisonment for not more than 15 years or both).
Whereas prior federal laws in this area provide for criminal penalties only, RICO grants the
district courts jurisdiction to "prevent and restrain violations of section 1962" as well as the
authority to impose fines and/or prison terms for proven violations. Id.§ 1964(a). Since civil
proceedings require a lesser burden of proof than criminal proceedings, the ability to sanction
RICO violations is greatly enhanced. See United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). In Cappetto, defendants were charged with committing two or more acts of receiving and sending wagering information, violations of § 1955 of the
United States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1976). 502 F.2d at 1354-55. In addition to prosecuting
under § 1955, the Government instituted a civil suit under RICO in order to obtain an injunction because defendants' acts also constituted a pattern of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962 (1976). 502 F.2d at 1355. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976), the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the issuance of the permanent injunction and divested one defendant of his interest in
the building in which the racketeering had taken place. 502 F.2d at 1358-59. See also United
States v. Winstead, 421 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (court issued order restraining defendants
from operating a gambling business).
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trating any enterprise affecting interstate commerce when such infiltration is
accomplished through the use of money derived from a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt. 15
RICO enhances the government's ability to control organized crime in
two ways. First, RICO broadens the scope of crimes which the federal government may prosecute by defining RICO offenses as the infiltration 16 of

15. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976). Section 1962 provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly
or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2,
title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and
without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of
assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of
the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their
accomplices in any pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt
after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding
securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect
one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any
interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
Id.
16. See id. Although not obvious in reading RICO, the first three subparts of § 1962 prohibit three separate and distinct unlawful infiltrations of enterprises engaged in interstate commerce. Interview with Gregory T. Magarity, Chief, Special Prosecutions Division, Office of the
United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (March 7, 1979). Section 1962(a)
is intended to preclude the legal acquisition of an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce
through the use of money received from racketeering or loan sharking. Id. See 18 U.S.C.
1962(a) (1976). Section 1962(b) is designed to prohibit the illegal acquisition of an interstate
business through racketeering or loan sharking. See id. § 1962(b). Section 1962(c) is aimed to
preclude the influence of racketeering and loan sharking on interstate business by persons
asociated with the enterprise. See id §1962(c). Consequently, each subpart of § 1962 varies in
the proof required to show a RICO violation. Interview with Gregory T. Magarity, Chief, Special Prosecutions Division, Office of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania (March 7, 1979). Section 1962(a) requires proof that money derived from racketeering or loan sharking was used to acquire an interest in an interstate business, which necessarily involves the difficult task of tracing money from its initial illegal receipt by the defendant
to its eventual disbursement in the enterprise. Id. Section 1962(b) requires proof that the business acquisition was illegal because it was achieved through racketeering or loan sharking,
which often involves proof of an unlawful "takeover" of the enterprise by the defendant. Id.
Section 1962(c) focuses on the enterprise and requires proof of some nexus between the defendant's racketeering or loansharking and the enterprise. Id. Since the proof requirements of
§ 1962(a) and (b) are more stringent than those of § 1962(c), most RICO defendants are charged
with violation of § 1962(c). Id. For the full text of § 1962, see note 15 supra.
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any enterprise 17 affecting interstate commerce, 18 by any person, 19 through2 1a
pattern of racketeering activity 20 or the collection of an unlawful debt.
Racketeering activity is defined in terms of certain predicate state law and
federal law offenses listed in section 1961(1),22 including many crimes previously tried solely in state courts. 23 RICO thus enables the federal government to sanction some crimes formerly prosecuted solely by state governments.
Second, RICO expands the federal government's remedial options for
sanctioning organized crime by providing for civil 24 as well as criminal remedies. 25 The utilization of the rules of civil procedure 26 and the evidentiary

17. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976). Section 1961(4) provides that an "enterprise includes any
individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." Id. The government need prove only
that the infiltrated enterprise, and not the illegal acts, affect interstate commerce. See United
States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976). All provisions of this section require that the infiltrated enterprise be "engaged in or conduct ... activities .. .which affect interstate or foreign commerce."
Id.
19. See id. § 1961(3). Section 1961(3) provides that a person "includes any individual or
entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property." Id. For a discussion of who
is a proper defendant in a RICO suit, see text accompanying notes 85-92 infra.
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976). Section 1961(5) provides that a "pattern of racketeering
activity requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within 10 years (excluding any ppriod of
imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." id.
21. See id. § 1961(6). Section 1961(6) provides that
"unlawful debt" means a debt (A) incurred or contracted in gambling activity which was in
violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or which
is unenforceable under State or Federal law in whole or in part as to principal or interest
because of the laws relating to usury, and (B) which was incurred in connection with the
business of gambling in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political
subdivision thereof, or the business of lending money or a thing of value at a rate usurious under State or Federal law, where the usurious rate is at least twice the enforceable
rate.
Id.
22. See id. § 1961(1).
23. See id. § 1961(1)(a). The predicate state offenses listed in this section are "any act or
threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in
narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year." Id.
24. See id. § 1964. A civil action may be brought in district court by the Attorney General
or by a private individual. Id. Other federal laws in this area provide for criminal sanctions
only. See notes 8 & 14 supra.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976). Criminal penalties include a maximum imprisonment of 25
years and/or a maximum fine of $25,000, and forfeiture of any business interest acquired or
maintained through such violation. Id.
Today, several states have statutes which provide for both civil and criminal prosecutions of'
organized criminals. See, e.g., CONN. CEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-129a to 3-129b (West Supp. 1978);
OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.91 (Page 1978). Some state statutes are modeled after RICO. See
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 842-1 to 842-12 (Supp. 1975).
26. Civil proceedings have the procedural advantages of amended pleadings, broader discovery, and the availability of appeal. See Note, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of
Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "Criminal Activity," 124 U. PA. L. REV. 192, 196
(1975).
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advantages 27 of a civil proceeding more readily allow a federal court to impose economic and injunctive sanctions on organized criminal activity. 28
RICO has nevertheless been questioned by courts and commentators. 29 The courts have been confronted with various problems of statutory construction, such as whether section 1962, making unlawful the infil31
30
includes illegitimate and public enterprises,
tration of "any enterprise,"
whether RICO was intended to restrict any individual, whether or not he is
a member of organized crime, who engages in the activities proscribed by
section 1962,32 and whether the federal or state statute of limitations is
applicable. 33 Furthermore, RICO defendants have unsuccessfully argued
that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, 34 and that it violates the ex post
facto clause 35 and the double jeopardy clause 36 of the Constitution.
27. The burden of proof in a civil proceeding requires that the plaintiff prove his case by a
preponderance of the evidence, whereas the burden of proof in a criminal case is much higher
since the state must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In Re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 361-62 (1969); Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880).
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964. Sections 1964(a) and (b) state:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and
restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including,
but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging
in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect
interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. In any action
brought by the United States under this section, the court shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination thereof. Pending final determination thereof, the
court may at any time enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other
actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem
proper.
Id.
29. See King, Wild Shots in the War on Crime, 20 J. PUB. L. 85, 98 (1971); notes 108-10
and accompanying text infra.
30. For the text of §1962, see note 15 supra.
31. For a discussion of whether RICO applies to the infiltration of illegitimate and public
enterprises, see notes 71-84 and accompanying text infra.
32. For a discussion of whether RICO applies to individuals who are not members of organized crime, see notes 85-92 and accompanying text infra.
33. For a discussion of whether the federal or state statute of limitations applies to RICO
suits, see notes 93-110 and accompanying text infra.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1050 (1975); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 440-41 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
The Supreme Court has stated that a criminal statute is void for vagueness where "men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning." Connally v. General Constr. Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). For a recent Surpeme Court decision following Connally, see Palmer
v. Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971).
35. See United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977) (Congress intended to avoid
the ex post facto prohibition by requiring that at least one act, comprising the pattern of racketeering activity, was committed after the statute's effective date); United States v. Campanale,
518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1975) (Congress drafted RICO to avoid any
possible violation of the ex post facto clause).
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3, which states: "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law
shall be passed." Id. The Supreme Court has defined an ex post facto law as one "that makes an
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C. Constitutional Challenges to RICO
Congress derived the power to enact RICO from the commerce clause
of the Constitution, which grants Congress the authority "to regulate Commerce . . . among the several States." 37 In rejecting the argument that
Congress exceeded this constitutional power in promulgating RICO, the
Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Cappetto,38 stated that "[t]he power of
Congress to prohibit activities made unlawful by state law which take place
in, or affect, interstate commerce has been settled." 39 Pursuant thereto, it
was argued in United States v. Vignola 40 that the government should be
required to show that defendant's activities affected interstate commerce in
order to establish federal jurisdiction . 4a The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled, however, that the government only had to prove that the enterprise involved had an impact on interstate commerce. 4 2 Finding that the burden of organized crime on interstate commerce was a rational basis for enacting RICO, 4 3 and that the
statute was an appropriate means of achieving the purpose a4 the court held

action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal." Caulder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 390 (1790) (emphasis by the Court). See United States v.
Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 417 (5th Cir. 1977).
36. See United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977). See also notes 60-70 and
accompanying text infra.
See U.S. CONrST. amend. V. The double jeopardy clause provides: "[N]or shall any person
." Id.
be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ..
37. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. The commerce clause provides that Congress shall
have the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes." Id.
In recent civil rights cases, the Supreme Court determined that congressional legislation is
within the commerce clause power if the regulated activity adversely affects interstate commerce in any way. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
38. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
39. 502 F.2d at 1356, citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill (1942); Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
40. No. 79-1132 (E.D. Pa., filed Jan. 8, 1979).
41. Id. slip op. at 8. Defendant, President Judge of the Philadelphia Traffic Court, possessed the power to appoint and remove writ servers. Id. slip op. at 2-3. Defendant was
charged with soliciting and accepting bribes from writ servers. Id.
42. Id. slip op. at 9-10. In so ruling, the court noted the language of § 1962, the legislative
intent to stop the infiltration of any enterprise by organized crime, and congressional authority
to regulate intrastate activities. Id. slip op. at 11. The court applied the "class of activities" test
employed in United States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), in finding that defendant's intrastate
activity was within the "class of activities" regulated by Congress which was found to have the
requisite impact on interstate commerce. United States v. Vignola, No. 79-1132, slip op. at
10-12 (E.D. Pa., filed Jan. 8, 1979).
43. United States v. Vignola, Noi 79-1132, slip op. at 11 (E.D. Pa., filed Jan. 8, 1979). In so
ruling, the court cited the purpose of RICO. Id. slip op. at 11. For the text of the congressional
statement of purpose in enacting RICO, see note 7 supra.
44. United States v. Vignola, No. 79-1132, slip op. at 11 (E.D. Pa., filed Jan. 8, 1979),
citing United States v. Sacco, 491 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d
653 (3d Cir. 1972).
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that RICO as applied was a legitimate exercise of Congress' commerce
power. 45
Additionally, the courts have consistently upheld RICO against claims
that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. 46 The United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, in United States v.
Scalzitti, 47 rejected a vagueness attack on RICO since its predicate offenses
49
are well defined in section 1961 of the Act.4 8 In United States v. Hawes,
defendants contended that RICO was unconstitutionally vague since the
statute gave no warning of the activities it proscribed. 50 Applying the traditional constitutional vagueness standard, 5 1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that since a person of average intelligence, in
reading the definitional section, 5 2 could not help but realize what activities
were unlawful under section 1962, RICO was not unconstitutionally vague. 5 3
Similarly, the courts have rejected claims that the application of RICO
in certain cases violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto
laws. 54 In United States v. Brown, 55 defendants alleged that because one of
the illegal acts relied upon in proving the "pattern of racketeering activity" 5 6
was committed before the effective date of RICO, the statute had an unconstitutional ex post facto effect. 57 The Fifth Circuit held, however, that because the statute requires that one of the acts comprising a "pattern" must
have occurred after the statute's effective date, 58 RICO did not violate the
59
ex post facto clause of the Constitution.
45. United States v. Vignola, No. 79-1132, slipop. at 15 (E.D.Pa., filed Jan. 8, 1979). The

(murt noted that another criminal statute which is "silent as to any nexus between defendant,
the activity, and interstate commerce" has been upheld. Id. slip op. at 9, citing United States v.
Sacco, 491 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1974) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1976)).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1050 (1975); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Scalzitti,
408 F. Supp. 1014 (W.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Wis.
1974); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. Amato, 367
F. Supp. 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
47. 408 F. Supp. 1014 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
48. Id. at 1015-16. The Scalzitti court stated: "The elements of the predicate offenses are
well-defined and established. It would be futile for a person to argue that he had no warning or
knowledge that his commission of such acts would violate the law." Id., quoting United States
v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
49. 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976).
50., Id. at 479.
51. The constitutional vagueness standard traditionally applied to criminal statutes provides
that a penal statute "must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties." Connally v. General Constr. Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
52. For the text of § 1961, RICO's definitional section, see notes 17 & 19-22 supra.
53. 529 F.2d at 479.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1050 (1975); United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Mandel,
415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976).
55. 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977).
56. For the statutory definition of a "pattern of racketeering activity," see note 20 supra.
57. 555 F.2d at 417.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976).
59. 555 F.2d at 417.
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Since section 1961(1) defines "racketeering activity" in terms of state law
and federal law offenses, 6 0 it has been argued that RICO unconstitutionally
62
6
subjects a defendant to double jeopardy. 1 In United States v. Frumento,
defendants were convicted under RICO for conspiracy and a pattern of racketeering activity which included bribery and extortion. 6 3 Defendants
64
claimed that their acquittal of state law criminal charges in state court
barred subsequent prosecution under RICO by operation of the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.65 The Third Circuit, however, held
that a federal prosecution was not barred by a prior state prosecution of the
same defendant for the same act. 6 6 Defendants further claimed that when,
as in this case sub judice, prosecution under RICO requires an allegation of
violations of state law, 67 the federal court must rely on the state court's
judgment concerning the state law offenses. 68 Defendants thus argued that
because they had been acquitted in state court, there existed no state law
violations on which to base a RICO prosecution.6 9 In rejecting this contention, the Frumento court stated that prosecution under RICO is not the
prosecution of the prior state offense, but rather the prosecution of a separate federal offense which is merely defined in terms of state crimes.70
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976).
61. For the text of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, see note 36 supra.
62. 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977).
63. Id. at 1086.
64. Id. at 1085-86.
65. Id. at 1086. Defendants' argument rested on the theory that in making the state offenses
a federal crime, RICO allowed federal courts to try the underlying state offenses. Id. at 1087.
66. Id. at 1086. The Frumento majority relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Abbate v
United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959), in which defendants were convicted in state court for violation of a state statute prohibiting destruction of another's property, and were later convicted on
the same facts in federal court for conspiracy to violate a federal statute. Id. at 188-89. Although
the same activity formed the basis for both the state and federal convictions, the Supreme Court
held that the subsequent federal prosecution was not barred by the prior state conviction. Id. at
196. See 563 F.2d at 1086.
Judge Aldisert filed a strong dissenting opinion in Frumento, asserting that the Supreme
Court in Abbate was in error and that recent Supreme Court cases, which have strengthened
the double jeopardy clause, present the possibility of overruling Abbate. Id. at 1092-93 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert noted that in a recent Supreme Court case, Chief Justice
Burger had stated that the double jeopardy clause was "a guarantee against being twice put to
trial for the same offense." Id. at 1093, quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661
(1977) (emphasis by the Court). Cf. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) (conviction of greater
offense precludes subsequent prosecution of lesser included offense).
67. Section 1962 prohibits the infiltration of any enterprise through a "pattern of racketeering activity," which is defined as the commission of two or more of specifically enumerated state
and federal law crimes. See note 20 supra.
68. 563 F.2d at 1087. Defendants based their argument on the Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Mason, 213 U.S. 115 (1909), which defendants claimed indicated that a federal
court must accept the judgment of the state court where it is necessary to decide whether the
state law crime was committed by the defendants for purposes of the federal trial. 563 F.2d at
1087. The Frumento majority, however, found that Mason was not applicable because it was not
specifically a double jeopardy holding. id.
69. 563 F.2d at 1087.
70. Id. The court stated: "The gravamen of section 1962 is a violation of federal law and
reference to state law is necessary only to identify the type of unlawful activity in which the
defendant intended to engage." Id., quoting United States v. Cerone, 452 F.2d 274, 286 (7th
Cir. 1971).
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D. Statutory Interpretation of RICO
71
Section 1962 prohibits the unlawful infiltration of any enterprise.
Since section 1961(4) broadly defines "enterprise," 72 the majority of courts
have applied RICO to the infiltration of illegitimate enterprises and public
entities as well as legitimate private enterprises. 73 The United States Court
of Appeals for the' Second Circuit, in United States v. Altese, 74 held that
RICO applied to defendant's illegitimate gambling business. 75 The Altese
court placed great emphasis on the words "any enterprise" in section 1962 76
and the congressional statement of purpose in the Act, 77 which calls for a
liberal interpretation of the statute. 78 In United States v. Fineman,7 9 defendant, a member of the Pennsylvania legislature, was convicted under
RICO for a bribery scheme in which defendant received money in exchange
for graduate school recommendations.8 0 The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that defendant's enterprise,
although organized solely for an illegitimate purpose, was within "the enterprise concept embodied in RICO." 81 Similarly, in United States v.
Frumento,82 the Third Circuit held that state agencies are "enterprises"
within the meaning of section 1962.83 The majority supported this holding
by referring to the congressional findings in the Act which express a concern
for the corruption of the entire American economy by organized crime.84

71. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976). For the text of § 1962, see note 15 supra.
72. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976). For the definition of "enterprise" in § 1961(4), see note
17 supra.
73. See, e.g., United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1977) (defendant prosecuted under RICO for association with prostitution business); United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d
436 (5th Cir. 1976) (fraud in legal gamblingbusiness); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th
Cir. 1976) (illegal gambling enterprise); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977) (illegal gambling enterprise); United States v. Fineman, 434
F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (collection of bribes); United States v. Castellano, 416 F. Supp.
125 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (extension of credit at usurious rates). But see United States v. Moeller,
402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975) (enterprise organized for the illegal purpose of burning buildings was not within the meaning of RICO). See also Note, supra note 26, at 198-206.
74. 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
75. 542 F.2d at 106-07.
76. Id. at 106. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976). For the text of this provision, see note 15
supra.
77. 542 F.2d at 106. For a statement of the purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, see note 7 supra.
78. See 542 F.2d at 106. The Act itself states that "[tihe provisions of this title shall be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941.
79. 434 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
80. Id. at 192.
81. Id. at 193. The court stated that "unlawful as well as lawful businesses are included
within the enterprise concept embodied in RICO." Id., citing United States v. Cappetto, 502
F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
82. 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977).
83. Id. at 1092.
84. Id. at 1090-91. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84
Stat. 941. The court further noted that "Congress was concerned with the infiltration of organized crime into the American economy and to the devastating effects that racketeering activity had upon it." 563 F.2d at 1090 (footnote omitted). In holding that RICO extends to the
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Although the stated purpose of RICO is "to seek the eradication of organized crime," 85 RICO has been used to prosecute persons who were not
members of organized crime. The Third Circuit, in United States v.
Forsythe,8 6 reversed the lower court's dismissal of indictments charging state
magistrates with RICO violations. 87 The majority held that the magistrates,
who received payoffs from a bail bond agency, were proper RICO defendants even though they were not members of the unlawfully infiltrated "enterprise," the bail bond agency."" In support of that holding, the Third
Circuit cited Congress' explicit direction that RICO "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."89 The Third Circuit also noted
that the language of section 1962 proscribes violation by "any person" who is
"associated with" the enterprise. 90 Since "any person" was not limited to
members of organized crime, 91 and since "associated with" was defined in
section 1962 as direct or indirect participation in the conduct of the enterprise, the court concluded that the magistrates were within the purview of
92
the statute.
Various cases have arisen in which RICO's statute of limitations has
been contested. 9 3 Although "racketeering activity" is defined in section
94
1961(1) in terms of state law crimes, the Third Circuit held in Forsythe 95

infiltration of public as well as private entities, the Third Circuit was in accord with a Fifth
Circuit case decided six weeks earlier. See United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.
1977). The Brown court held that the local police department was an "enterprise" within the
purview of § 1961(4). Id. at 416. See also United States v. Vignola, No. 79-1132 (E.D. Pa., filed
Jan. 8, 1979) (the Philadelphia Traffic Court held to be an enterprise within the meaning of
RICO); United States v. Cianfrani, Cr. No. 77-412 (E.D. Pa., bench op. filed Dec. 19, 1977)
(Pennsylvania State Legislature an enterprise within the meaning of RICO). For the definition
of "enterprise" in section 1961(4), see note 17 supra.
85. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1,84 Stat. 941. See note 7
supra.
86. 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977).
87. Id. at 1131. Defendants in Forsythe were magistrates charged with bribery in the form
of a payoff referral scheme. Id. Defendants accepted money payments from a bail bond agency
in return for the referral to the agency of people who were brought before the defendants for
the setting of bail. Id.
88. Id. at 1135-36.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1136. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976).
91. 560 F.2d at 1136. The court found that "[t]he legislative intent was to make RICO
violations dependent on behavior, not status.'" Id. (citation omitted).
92. Id. The Forsythe court's reasoning that the state magistrates were proper RICO defendants was derived in part from the Maryland district court's decision in United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976), in which the Mandel court also relied upon congressional
intent that RICO prosecutions be made dependent on the commission of certain proscibed
activities, rather than on an individual's status as a member of organized crime. ld. at 1018-19.
See 560 F.2d at 1136. One writer has noted that the "Senate report does not claim, however,
that the listed offenses are committed primarily by members of organized crime, only that those
offenses are characteristic of organized crime. See McClellan, supra note 11, at 142 (emphasis in
original).
93. For an analysis of the applicable statute of limitations for RICO offenses, see notes
94-110 infra
94. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976).
95. See notes 86-92 and accompanying text supra.
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that the federal, rather than the state, statute of limitations was applicable to
RICO violations. 96 The Forsythe court relied in part on legislative history
reflecting proposals that RICO violations be subject to the federal statute of
limitations for "continuing offenses," 97 reasoning that because this proposal
was not enacted, Congress intended that the federal five year period of limitations for noncapital offenses should apply. 98 The court also found signifi99
cant the fact that "RICO was not designed to punish state law violations,"
but merely incorporates "the elements of those state offenses for definitional
purposes." 100
0
In United States v. Davis, '1
the Third Circuit expanded the Forsythe
holding 102 in a case involving an indictment under RICO for a state offense 103 for which the state statute of limitations had run. 10 4 The Davis
court held that the section 1961(1) definition of racketeering activity as
crimes "chargeable under state law" 105 means "chargeable at the time the
act was committed" rather than chargeable at the time of the indictment. 106
Reasoning that the state statute of limitations could not have run at the time
10 7
the act was committed, the court found an actionable RICO violation.
Judge.Aldisert, on the other hand, 10 8 argued that by using the words
"chargeable under state law," Congress intended that the crimes be charge-

96. 560 F.2d at 1134. The federal statute of limitations for noncapital offenses is five years.
18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1976). The Pennsylvania statute of limitations is two years. 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 5552 (1978). The court thus held that the RICO prosecution was not barred since the
federal statute of limitations had not run. 560 F.2d at 1135.
97. See 560 F.2d at 1134, citing S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). See also 18
U.S.C. § 3284 (1976).
98. 560 F.2d at 1134. The Forsythe court stated that "the fact that proposed 1962(e) was not
enacted as part of RICO indicates that Congress intended to rely on 18 U.S.C. § 3284." Id. It is
submitted that the court intended to cite 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1976) rather than 18 U.S.C. § 3284
(1976). Section 3282 provides: "Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall
be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or
the information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been committed." Id. § 3282.
99. 560 F.2d at 1135.
100. Id.
101. 576 F.2d 1065 (3d Cir. 1978).
102. Id. at 1066-67. The Forsythe court held that § 3282 of the United States Code, 18
U.S.C. § 3282 (1976), providing a five year statute of limitations, was the applicatle statute of
limitations in a RICO case. See 560 F.2d at 1134.
103. 576 F.2d at 106Q. Defendant, a county prison warden, was convicted under RICO for a
pattern of racketeering activity which involved the solicitation and acceptance of bribes in "consideration for a decision, opinion, recommendation, vote and exercise of discretion as Warden."
Id.
104. Id. at 1066-67. The applicable Pennsylvania statute of limitations is two years. See 42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 5552 (1978).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976).
106. 576 F.2d at 1067. The court stated: "We now make explicit what was implicit in Forsythe: the words 'chargeable under State law' in § 1961(1)(A) mean 'chargeable under State law
at the time the offense was committed."' Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1068 (Aldisert, J., concurring).
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able under state law at the time of the RICO indictment. 10 9 He thus concluded that because the state limitations period had expired by the time the
federal complaint had been filed, the crimes were no longer chargeable
under state law, and thus the elements of a RICO offense were lacking. 110
Finally, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania addressed the question of what constitutes a "pattern of racketeering activity" in United States v. Salvitti. "I The court held that two
acts within a single transaction constitute such a "pattern," and that it was
not necessary to prove the commission of two wholly independent acts."12
III.

ANALYSIS

RICO has been upheld by the courts against all constitutional attacks to
date. Despite its complex structure, the courts have ruled that RICO satisfies the traditional constitutional vagueness standard 113 and complies with
the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. 114 Moreover, although a "pattern of racketeering activity" is defined in terms of state law as well as federal law violations, RICO has been found to comply with the double
jeopardy clause of the Constitution even when the defendant has been previously tried and acquitted for the state offenses which constitute the predi5
cate RICO violation.11
It is submitted, however, that RICO is vulnerable to another constitutional challenge not yet fully addressed by the courts. The question remains
whether Congress has the power under the commerce clause to enact a
criminal statute which does not require some nexus between the defendant's
activities and interstate commerce. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania's
109. Id. at 1069 (Aldisert, J., concurring). Judge Aldisert noted that "[tihe use of the present
tense indicates that this provision is to apply only to those acts chargeable and punishable at the
time of the indictment." Id.
110. Id. at 1068-69 (Aldisert, J., concurring). Furthermore, Judge Aldisert argued that the
majority's interpretation of "chargeable under State law" amounted to a broad statutory construction of a criminal statute which had been precluded by the Supreme Court in several
decisions. Id. See, e.g., Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 830-31 (1974); United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971);
Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 177-78 (1958); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84
(1955). In Bell the Supreme Court relied on the maxim that where the language of a criminal
statute is ambiguous, "the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity" in holding that the
simultaneoustransportation of two women across state lines in violation of the Mann Act did not
make the defendant punishable for two offenses. Id. In accordance with Bell, Judge Aldisert
contended that since the majority did not interpret § 1961(1) in favor of "lenity," the majority's
holding was contrary to Supreme Court decisions regarding the proper interpretation of ambiguous criminal statutes. 576 F.2d at 1069 (Aldisert, J., concurring).
111. 451 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Defendant was convicted on one count of bribery
and three counts of mail fraud which constituted the predicate RICO offense. Id. at 196.
112. Id. at 200. The court concluded that "a single, ongoing scheme to defraud by obtaining
bribes or kickbacks, which involves a series of unlawful acts, can establish a pattern for purposes
of RICO, and that it is not necessary to establish two or more totally independent criminal
acts." Id.
113. See notes 46-53 and accompanying text supra.
114. See notes 54-59 and accompanying text supra.
115. See notes 60-70 and accompanying text supra.
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ruling in United States v. Vignola 116 is not wholly dispositive of this issue.
In Vignola, the district court rejected defendant's claim that the government
show a connection between defendant's activities and interstate commerce,
and held that Congress intended RICO to require that the government
prove only that the activities of the enterprise affected interstate commerce."i 7 The Vignola court noted that if Congress had intended to require
a connection between the defendant's activities and interstate commerce, it
had the power to impose such a requirement. Ill Indeed, Congress has
promulgated several statutes requiring a link between the defendant's activities and interstate commerce which have been upheld as valid exercises
of the commerce power, even though the effect on commerce may be remote or indirect.119 The Vignola majority, however, cited no criminal statute which does not require solhe nexus between defendant and interstate
commerce.' 20 While it is true that in most RICO prosecutions the defendant is so directly involved in the enterprise that both the defendant's aid
the enterprise's activities affect commerce,' 2 ' there are cases .in which the
activities of the defendant and of the enterprise are not coextensive. 122 In
such a case, the defendant's activities may have no irpact on interstate
commerce. Since cases may arise in which a RICO defendant had absolutely
no effect on interstate commerce, it can be asserted that Congress overreached its commerce power in enacting RICO without a requirement that
the defendant's activities have some effect on interstate commerce.
Furthermore, the manner in which RICO has been interpreted by the
courts is also subject to criticism. Although a pattern of racketeering activity
is defined in terms of state law as well as federal law, the courts have
applied the federal statute of limitations in RICO prosecutions. 123 Moreover,

116. No. 79-1132 (E.D. Pa., filed Jan. 8, 1979). See notes 40-45 and accompanying text
supra.
117. See notes 40-45 and accompanying text supra.
118. United States v. Vignola, No. 79-1132, slip op. at 9 (E.D. Pa., filed Jan. 8, 1979), citing
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1976). To prove a violation of § 1951(a), the Government must establish a
nexus between the defendant's activity and interstate commerce. See id.
119. See, e.g., Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925) (Court upheld criminal statute
prohibiting the transportation of stolen vehicles in interstate commerce); Champion v. Ames,
188 U.S. 321 (1903) (Court sustained Federal Lottery Act making the interstate transportation of
lottery tickets unlawful).
120. See United States v. Vignola, No. 79-1132 (E.D. Pa., filed Jan. 8, 1979). The Vignola
court confronted the issue whether Congress intended that RICO require a showing of a connection between the defendant's activity and interstate commerce, but did not confront the
constitutional issue of whether Congress acted within its commerce power in enacting a criminal
statute without such a requirement. Id. But see note 45 supra.
121. See, e.g., United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (defendant's
scheme of accepting money payments in exchange for graduate school recommendations constituted an "enterprise"); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 925 (1975) (defendants' illegal gambling business constituted an "enterprise").
122. See, e.g., United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977) (defendant's only
connection with the "enterprise" was in the collection of bribes from the "enterprise"); United
States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (defendant's racketeering activity unrelated to
the "enterprise").
123. See notes 93-110 and accompanying text supra.
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the courts have applied RICO to the infiltration of illegitimate and public
enterprises as well as to the infiltration of legitimate private enterprises.' 2 4
Finally, although the purpose of RICO is to combat organized crime, violators of section 1962 have been successfully prosecuted under RICO regard25
less of whether they are members of organized crime. 1
The courts have supported these holdings in part by citing Congress'
explicit direction in the Act to construe RICO liberally. 126 Traditionally,
however, ambiguous criminal statutes have been interpreted narrowly in
favor of the defendant on the rationale that "fair warning should be accorded
[to the defendant] as to what conduct is criminal." 127 The courts have found
that RICO is not unconstitutionally vague because its provisions give
adequate warning of what activities are proscribed.12 8 It is submitted, however, that by authorizing a liberal interp'retation of RICO, Congress has
created the possibility that broad judicial interpretation of the Act will deny
defendants fair warning of the activities prohibited by RICO. The broad interpretation of the Act by the courts therefore raises the argument that
RICO as applied is unconstitutionally vague by failing to give adequate warning of its proscribed conduct.
IV. CONCLUSION

In enacting RICO, Congress sought to enhance the government's ability
to fight organized crime in the United States.129 The foregoing cases demonstrate that RICO has been effectively employed in the Third Circuit, has
survived all constitutional attacks thus far, and has had its parameters fairly
well delineated. Unresolved issues remain, however, of whether Congress
exceeded its commerce power in enacting RICO without requiring some
nexus between the defendant's activity and interstate commerce, and
whether broad judicial interpretation of the Act unconstitutionally subjects
defendants to criminal sanctions without fair warning.
Thomas C. Grimm
124. See notes 71-84 and accompanying text supra.
125. See notes 85-92 and accompanying text supra.
126. See note 78 supra.
127. Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974). See also United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
128. See notes 46-53 and accompanying text supra.
129. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
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LAW-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DUE TO CIRCUMSTANCES OF
CASE DEFENDANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF ANY CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS BY ENTERING PLEA OF NOLO CONTENDERE WITHOUT
BEING ADVISED OF MAXIMUM SENTENCE WHICH COULD BE IMPOSED.

Duffy v. Cuyler (1978)
On October 24, 1972, defendant Charles Duffy was sentenced to a
prison term by the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas on charges of forcible rape, burglary, and aggravated robbery. 1 During the trial, defendant
had entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charges, 2 after which the trial
judge had permitted both the prosecution and the defense to present testimony. 3 In order to challenge the voluntariness of his plea, defendant filed
a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 4 The district court found that defendant had
1. Duffy v. Cuyler, 581 F.2d 1059, 1060, 1062 (3d Cir. 1978). Defendant was given a
sentence of 7.5 to 15 years. Id. at 1062.
2. Id. at 1060. Defense counsel originally informed the court that defendant wished to
plead guilty. Id. Defendant testified, however, that he did not remember the crime. Id. at 1061
& n.2. For this reason, the trial judge permitted counsel for the defense to withdraw the guilty
plea and enter a plea of nolo contendere after the plea was fully explained to defendant. Id. at
1061.
3. Id. Defense counsel declined to present evidence or to conduct cross-examination. Id.
4. Id. at 1059-60. Federal habeas corpus relief is available to a prisoner convicted in a state
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). Section 2254(a) provides in pertinent part:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
Id. § 2254(a).
The United States Magistrate to whom defendant's habeas corpus petition was initially referred recommended that the writ be granted since the record did not show that defendant had
been informed of the maximum sentence when he entered his plea. 581 F.2d at 1062. Prior to
petitioning for habeas corpus relief, defendant had not contended that his plea of nolo contendere was defective for this reason. Id.
Prior to seeking habeas corpus relief, defendant had petitioned for relief under the
Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act (Act), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180 (Purdon Supp.
1978). 581 F.2d at 1062. The Act established a postconviction procedure applicable as the exclusive procedure in cases in which it is alleged that a conviction or sentence was imposed in
violation of due process. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1180-1 to 14 (Purdon Supp. 1978). To be
eligible for relief under the Act, a person must prove:
(a) That he has been convicted of a crime,
(b) That he is incarcerated in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under a sentence of
death or imprisonment, or on parole or probation,
(c) That his conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the following reasons:
(1) The introduction of evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful arrest;
(2) The introduction of evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure;
(3) The introduction of a coerced confession into evidence;
(4) The introduction into evidence of a statement obtained in the absence of counsel at
a time when representation is constitutionally required;
(5) The infringement of his privilege against self-incrimination under either Federal or
State law;
(6) The denial of his constitutional right to representation by competent counsel;
(7) A plea of guilty unlawfully induced;
(8) The unconstitutional suppression of evidence by the State:

(277)
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not been denied his constitutional rights and subsequently denied defendant's writ. 5 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed, 6 holding that in these circumstances defendant was not deprived of any constitutional protections by entering a plea of nolo contendere
without being advised of the maximum sentence which could be imposed.
Duffy v. Cuyler, 581 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1978).
Derived from the Latin phrase meaning "I will not contest it," 7 the plea
of nolo contendere has been primarily used to prevent the introduction of
a plea in civil proceedings founded on the same facts. 8 While the plea
has long been recognized in Pennsylvania 9 and the federal courts, 10 the
numerous ways in which it has been defined has resulted in some confusion.1 1 In North Carolina v. Alford, 12 the United States Supreme Court
(9) The unconstitutional use by the State of perjured testimony;
(10) The obstruction by State officials
of petitioner's right of appeal;
(11) His being twice placed in jeopardy;
(12) The abridgment in any other way of any right guaranteed by the constitution or
laws of this State or the constitution or laws of the United States, including a right that
was not recognized as existing at the time of the trial if the constitution requires retrospective application of that right; or
.(13) The unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that has subsequently
become available and that would have affected the outcome of the trial if it had been
introduced.
(d) That the error resulting in his conviction and sentence has not been finally litigated or
waived.
Id. § 1180-3. See generally Doty, The Purposes and Application of the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act, 45 PA. B.A.Q. 480 (1974).
Defendant in the instant case alleged that he had been under the influence of drugs at the
time the plea was taken, that the plea was involuntary, that he did not understand it, and that
he did not knowingly and intelligently enter it. 581 F.2d at 1062. The Philadelphia Court of
Common Pleas denied defendant's petition. Id. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed
without opinion and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declined allocatur. Id.
5. 581 F.2d at 1062. The district judge found defendant not to be a credible witness and
found that defendant did appreciate that he faced a substantial period of imprisonment. Id. at
1062, 1064 n.6.
6. The case was heard by Judges Hunter, Weis, and Garth. Judge Weis wrote the majority
opinion and Judge Garth wrote the dissent.
7. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1198 (4th ed. 1968). At early common law, the plea was used
as an indication of a defendant's willingness to accept a fine in lieu of imprisonment and to rely
on the mercy of the Crown. Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451, 453-54 (1926) (citation
omitted). For a discussion of the plea's early history, see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,
35-36 (1970); Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451, 453-54 (1926); Note, The Nature and
Consequences of the Plea of Nolo Contendere, 33 NEB. L. REV. 428 (1954).
8. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1-4066(4), at 58 (3d ed. 1940 &
Supp. 1970). See Lenvin & Meyers, Nolo Contendere: Its Nature and Implications, 51 YALE
L.J. 1255, 1263 (1942).
Nolo contendere is not generally employed in criminal cases such as the one under discussion. 581 F.2d 1062. Its principal modern utility is in criminal tax fraud or antitrust prosecutions, in which the introduction of a nolo plea will not preclude a defendant from contesting
subsequent civil actions which are often associated with such offenses. Id. See Note, Nolo Pleas
in Antitrust Cases, 79 HAtV. L. REV. 1475 (1966).
9. See Commonwealth v. Holstine, 132 Pa. 357, 19 A. 273 (1890); Buck v. Commonwealth,
107 Pa. 486 (1884); Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 44 Pa. Super. Ct. 626 (1910).
10. See Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451, 452 (1926).
11. In November 1952, the editors of the North CarolinaLaw Review conducted a survey of
judges and solicitors in the recorders' and superior courts of North Carolina as to the effects of a
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acknowledged that the plea of nolo contendere had been described in some
instances as "in effect, a plea of guilty ... and [in] other[s] as a query
directed to the court to determine the defendant's guilt." 3
The decisions of the Pennsylvania state courts, h6wever, have treated a
plea of nolo contendere as equivalent to a plea of guilty1 4 and, upon acceptance of the plea by the trial court, 15 have required no additional testimony
in order to sentence.' 6 Accordingly, once a plea of nolo contendere is accepted by a trial court, the question of the defendant's guilt or innocence is
no longer at issue. 17 In Commonwealth v. Rousch,' 8 it was thus held to be
reversible error for a trial judge to accept a plea of nolo contendere and then.
hear evidence not calculated to ascertain the extent of punishment but to
determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.19
More importantly, the United States Supreme Court, while expressing
no opinion as to a plea of nolo contendere, has determined that the entry of
nolo contendere plea. In 20 replies, 59 or 60 different viewpoints were expressed. Note, 30
N.CL. REV. 407, 407 n.1 (1952). See also Lenvin & Meyers, supra note 8, at 1255.
12. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
13. Id. at 35,n.8 (citations omitted). A North Carolina statute had originally authorized the
use of a nolo contendere plea as a conditional plea. Lane-Reitcher, Nolo Contendere in North
Carolina, 34 N.C.L. REv. 280, 281 (1956). Upon acceptance of the plea, the trial judge heard
evidence and, if satisfied that the defendant was not guilty, dismissed the nolo plea. See id. The
statute was subsequently held repugnant to the state's constitutional guarantee of trial by jury,
and today a plea of nolo contendere is equivalent to a guilty plea in that state. See id.
14. Commonwealth v. Holstine, 132 Pa. 357, 361, 19 A. 273, 273 (1890); Commonwealth v.
Hayes, 245 Pa. Super. Ct. 521, 523, 369 A.2d 750, 751 (1976); Commonwealth v. Warner, 228
Pa. Super. Ct. 31, 32, 324 A.2d 362, 363 (1974).
15. See PA. R. CPUM. P. 319. Rule 319 permits entry of a plea of nolo contendere only with
consent of the court. Id.
16. See Commonwealth v. Holstine, 132 Pa. 357, 361, 19 A. 273, 273 (1890).
17. Ferguson v. Reinhart, 125 Pa. Super. Ct. 154, 159, 190 A. 153, 155 (1937), citing
Commonwealth v. Rousch, 113 Pa. Super. Ct. 182, 172 A. 484 (1934).
18. 113 Pa. Super. Ct. 182, 172 A. 484 (1934). In Rousch, defendant was indicted for having
subscribed to false written statements of the financial company of which he was treasurer. Id. at
183, 172 A. at 484. Based upon the gravity of the case, the trial judge refused to consider the
plea of nolo contendere as equivalent to a plea of guilty, but rather found the defendant guilty
after listening to testimony produced by the prosecution and the defense. Id. at 183-84, 172 A.
at 485. On appeal, the superior court reversed, viewing the trial judge's decision based on the
evidence to be violative of Pennsylvania's constitutional right to trial by jury. Id. at 185-86, 172
A. at 485. The superior court stated that the correct procedure for a trial judge to follow under
such circumstances was to advise the defendant to withdraw his nolo plea and conduct a jury
trial. Id.
It should be noted that the trial judge's disinclination to accept a nolo contendere plea in
Rousch may have stemmed from disagreement among jurisdictions as to whether or not a nolo
plea may be accepted in felony cases. See Lenvin & Meyers, supra note 8, at 1258-59. It seems
to be settled law in Pennsylvania, however, that a plea of nolo contendere may be accepted
even though imprisonment is possible. Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 44 Pa. Super. Ct. 626, 629
(1910) (allocatur refused).
19. 113 Pa. Super. Ct. at 185-86, 172 A. at 485. Moreover, in 1973 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that failure to inform the defendant of the maximum sentence, without more,
did not nullify a guilty plea where it was clear that the defendant did in fact know the maximum
sentence. Commonwealth v. McNeil, 453 Pa. 102, 106, 305 A.2d 51, 53-54 (1973). A more
recent case in which it was unclear from the record that the defendant had such knowledge has
taken the position that there must be disclosure. Commonwealth v. Kulp, 476 Pa. 358, 361, 382
A.2d 1209, 1212 (1978).
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a plea of guilty affects crucial constitutional rights.2 0 In McCarthy v. United
States 2 the Supreme Court noted: "[A] defendant who enters such a plea
simultaneously waives several constitutional rights, including his privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right
to confront his accusers." 22 Furthermore, since due process requires that a
waiver of constitutional rights be made both knowingly and voluntarily, 23 the
Supreme Court held in Boykin v. Alabama 24 that waiver of these important
25
rights cannot be presumed from the silent record.
While the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit have not determined
whether the failure of the trial court to inform the defendant of the
maximum sentence prior to accepting a guilty plea will automatically render
the plea invalid, regardless of any awareness on the part of the defendant as
to the consequences he faces, 2 6 several federal courts have confronted this
issue with varying resolutions. Their reasoning is relevant here as Pennsylvania courts consider a nolo contendere plea to be equivalent to a plea of
20. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
21. 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
22. Id. at 466 (footnote omitted).
23. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Consequently, if a defendant does not
knowingly and voluntarily enter a plea of guilty, the plea is void. Machibroda v. United States,
368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
24. 395 U.S. 238 (1968).
25. Id. at 242-43. According to the Boykin Court, the requirement that the waiver be express and appear of record insured that there was a "reliable determination" as to the voluntariness of the guilty pleas. Id. at 242, quoting Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 387 (1964). The
Boykin Court also stated that this requirement would provide for more adequate review at the
appellate level. 395 U.S. at 244.
26. See 581 F.2d at 1063. Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is
applicable only to defendants convicted of federal offenses, requires that a defendant be person-,
ally informed of both the mandatory minimum penalty and the maximum possible penalty provided by law. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c). Rule 11(c) provides in pertinent part:
(c) Advice to Defendant
Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the
defendant personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he understands, the following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum
penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law; and
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has the right to be
represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding against him and, if necessary,
one will be appointed to represent him; and
(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already
been made, and that he has the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial has the right
to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against
him, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself; and
(4) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will not be a further trial of any
kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere he waives the right to a trial; and
(5) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, the court may ask him questions about
the offense to which he has pleaded, and if he answers these questions under oath, on the
record, and in the presence of counsel, his answers may later be used against him in a
prosecution for perjury or false statement.
Id. The rule was designed to ensure that a defendant who pleads guilty does so voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. Woodward v. United States, 426 F.2d 959, 962 (3d Cir. 1976). See
generally 1974 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 11, FED. R. CRlIM. P. 11
(1976).
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guilty. 27 In Caputo v. Henderson,28 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that lack of knowledge of the maximum sentence
will not invalidate a guilty plea unless the defendant can establish that he
would not have entered the plea had he been informed of the possible
punishment.29 On the other hand, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit required that the defendant pleading guilty know the
"outer limits of the penalty" to which he was exposed. 3 0 Similarly, in
United States ex rel Pebworthe v. Conte, 3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant must3 2be informed of the
range of allowable punishment" that may be imposed.
In addition, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania has maintained that the defendant's plea of guilty was a valid
waiver of constitutional rights if the defendant was aware that "he faced a
very substantial prison term." 3 3 In United States ex rel. Nikodemski v.
awareness from the
Pennsylvania,3 4 the district court inferred this requisite
35
crime.
same
the
for
conviction
prior
defendant's
Recognizing that the pertinent decisions were in conflict, the Third Circuit began its analysis by examining the treatment of defendant's plea of nolo
contendere by the Pennsylvania trial court.36 While Judge Weis, writing for
the majority, acknowledged that Pennsylvania appellate decisions have
treated a nolo contendere plea as equivalent to a guilty plea,3 7 he nonetheless maintained that defendant and the trial judge did not intend that result
in this instance. 38 Particularly, the Duffy court noted that the state trial
judge had received testimony from several witnesses 39 and had "obviously

27. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
28. 541 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1976).
29. Id. at 984. See also Kelleher v. Henderson, 531 F.2d 78, 81 (2d Cir. 1976).
30. See Wade v. Wainwright, 420 F.2d 898, 900 (5th Cir. 1969) (defendant's total ignorance
as to length of possible sentence is inconsistent with due process). The Wade court construed
the constitutional requirement of a "voluntary" plea of guilty to include an understanding of the
consequences of the plea. Id. Accord, Coney v. Wyrick, 532 F.2d 94, 99-101 (8th Cir. 1976)
(guilty plea made without full understanding of the consequences will not sustain a conviction);
Bailey v. MacDougal, 392 F.2d 155, 161 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968) (due
process requires that a guilty plea not be accepted unless defendant understands its consequences).
31. 489 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1974).
32. Id. at 268. In Pebworthe, the court held that the state court judge had the responsibility
to advise the defendant of the punishment that might be imposed as a direct consequence of his
guilty plea. Id. Accord, Yellowwolf v. Morris, 536 F.2d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1976) (rule not
applicable retroactively). In Yellowwolf, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a defendant who is not
informed of the maximum sentence could not have made an "intelligent" waiver of his trial
right. Id. at 815.
33. United States ex rel. Smith v. Johnson, 403 F. Supp. 1381, 1393 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd,
538 F.2d 322 (3d Cir. 1976) (defendant informed that he faced a possible sentence of 60 years
when the maximum term was 80 years).
34. 320 F. Supp. 1154 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
35. Id. at 1156.
36. 581 F.2d at 1062.
37. Id. at 1063. See notes 14-16 and accompanying text supra.
38. 581 F.2d at 1063.
39. Id.
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believed that the prosecution had made out its case when she entered 'Adjudged Guilty' on the record." 40 Accordingly, under these "highly unusual
circumstances," 4 1 the majority construed defendant's plea of nolo contendere to be analogous to a plea of not guilty, and thus determined that disclosure of the maximum sentence possible was not constitutionally required. 42
Moreover, the majority emphasized that even if the plea had been
viewed as equivalent to a guilty plea, disclosure of a maximum sentence by
the judge has not been universally adopted as a constitutional prerequisite to
a plea of guilty. 43 In addition, Judge Weis determined that the rationale
developed by the Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama44 applied in
Duffy, 45 and concluded that defendant's privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his opportunity to confront his
accusers were adequately protected. 46 Furthermore, the majority found that
defendant was aware of the severity of the sentence because he had previously been convicted of a similar crime 4 7 and that defendant had not established that he would not have entered his plea if he had been informed of
48
the maximum sentence.
While expressing great reluctance in dissenting, 49 Judge Garth
explained that he could not agree that pleas of guilty or nolo contendere did

40. Id.
41. Id. at 1064.
42. Id. But see note 53 and accompanying text infra (dissent arguing that disclosure of
maximum sentences is constitutionally required in this situation).
43. 581 F.2d at 1063. See notes 26-35 and accompanying text supra.
44. 395 U.S. 238 (1968). For a discussion of Boykin, see notes 24 & 25 and accompanying
text supra.
45. 581 F.2d at 1064.
46. Id. The record shows that, at the time defendant originally pleaded guilty, counsel informed him in open court of his right to either a jury or nonjury trial, to cross-examine the
prosecution's witnesses, and to present evidence in his own defense. Id. at 1060. The Duffy
court concluded from the record that there had been an express waiver of defendant's right to a
jury trial. Id. at 1064. The court also stated that the right against self-incrimination was not of
consequence since defendant, in pleading nolo contendere, did not make an admission of guilt.
Id. Finally, the Duffy court noted that defendant had not waived his right to cross-examination
because the opportunity to cross-examine and to present evidence had been offered to defense
counsel. Id.
47. Id. The state court record revealed that in 1968 defendant was sentenced to a prison
term of seven years for assault and battery in connection with the attempted strangulation of an
elderly woman. Id. n.5. Doubting the credibility of defendant's testimony, the district court
found that defendant did in fact know he could receive a substantial prison sentence. Id. n.6.
In its analysis, the majority appears to be referring to the cases from the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania which consider a guilty plea to be a valid
waiver of constitutional rights if the defendant was aware that "he faced a very substantial prison
term." See United States ex rel. Smith v. Johnson, 403 F. Supp. 1381, 1393 (E.D. Pa. 1975),
aff'd, 538 F.2d 322 (3d Cir. 1976). It is important to note that in United States ex rel.
Nikodemski v. Pennsylvania, 320 F. Supp. 1154 (E.D. Pa. 1970), the court found such awareness in the defendant's prior conviction for the same crime. See notes 33-35 and accompanying
text supra.
48. 581 F.2d at 1064. In so deciding, the Duffy majority apparently applied the standard
adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Caputo. See text
accompanying notes 28 & 29 supra.
49. 581 F.2d at 1065 (Garth, J., dissenting).
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not require prior disclosure of the maximum sentence possible. 50 Judge
Garth stated that "one of the most significant factors in a defendant's decision to waive his constitutional rights" by entering a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere is "the extent of punishment which may be imposed by the trial
judge. '" 5 1 The dissent determined that without an affirmative showing on
the record of disclosure of the maximum sentence possible, a plea could not
be construed as a voluntary and knowing waiver of constitutional protections. 52 Judge Garth therefore concluded that an explanation of the
maximum sentence to which a defendant may be subjected was constitutionplea may someally required "even though the taking of a nolo contendere
53
plea."
guilty
not
a
after
held
trial
the
resemble
times
While the majority and dissenting opinions in Duffy illustrate the conflicting views concerning the constitutional prerequisite to entering a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere, 54 it is submitted that the majority properly recognized that the reasoning underlying the constitutional protections established
for guilty pleas 55 made disclosure of the maximum sentence unnecessary
under the facts of this case. 56 The majority concluded that no constitutional
protections had been waived 57 and that the instant circumstances were so
similar to those of a not guilty plea that special constitutional protections
were not warranted. 58 The majority's analysis of the facts appears, however,
to be unsound in that defendant did in fact waive some basic constitutional
rights. It is submitted that Judge Garth's view more accurately concludes
from the facts that defendant's rights to a jury trial, to confront his accusers,
and to present a defense, had not been sufficiently protected, and that disclosure of the maximum penalty may thus have been constitutionally required. 59
Furthermore, it is submitted that the Duffy court failed to appropriately
consider the plea of nolo contendere in the state context. 60 The
characterization of the nolo contendere plea by Judge Weis as resembling a
not guilty plea 6 1 may have been unwarranted in light of Pennsylvania appellate decisions which maintain that a plea of nolo contendere is similar to a
plea of guilty. 6 2 Specifically, the court did not adequately consider Coln50. Id. at 1066 (Garth, J.,dissenting).
51. Id. at 1065 (Garth, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 1065-66 (Garth, J., dissenting). Judge Garth seemingly adopted the reasoning
employed by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in the cases in which they held disclosure of
maximum sentence to be constitutionally required. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text

supra.
53. 581 F.2d at 1068 (Garth, J.,dissenting). But see notes 37-42 supra (majority holding that
disclosure not constitutionally required under such circumstances).
54. See notes 26-35 and accompanying text supra.
55. See notes 20-25 and accompanying text supra.
56. 581 F.2d at 1064.
57. See id., note 46 supra.
58. 581 F.2d at 1064.
59. Id. at 1067 (Garth, J.,dissenting).
60. See notes 14-19 and accompanying text supra.
61. See 581 F.2d at 1063-64; text accompanying notes 38-42 supra.
62. See note 14 supra.
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monwealth v. Rousch 63 which found reversible error in a trial judge's hearing evidence to determine a defendant's guilt after the defendant had pled
64
nolo contendere.
The Third Circuit, by restricting its decision to the facts of the case at
bar,6 5 has effectively limited the precedential value of its decision. While the
Duffy decision reflects some of the previously announced standards followed
by other federal courts, 66 the court's selective adoption of these standards
only serves to augment the confusion surrounding the issue of the specific
constitutional prerequisites to a waiver of constitutional rights through a
plea. Other federal courts seeking guidance will be forced to make detailed
comparisons of underlying facts in order to determine the relevance of the
Duffy holding to the case sub judice.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the majority in Duffy failed to fully
consider the broader jaspects of the plea proceeding and its effect upon constitutional safeguards. 6 7 Until either the Third Circuit or the Supreme
Court provides a more definitive response to this issue, practitioners and
judges in the Third Circuit will receive little guidance from the Duffy deci8
sion. 6
Ellen C. Mecklenborg
63.
19 and
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

113 Pa. Super. Ct. 182, 172 A. 484 (1934). For a discussion of Rousch, see notes 18 &
accompanying text supra.
113 Pa. Super. Ct. at 185-86, 172 A. at 485.
581 F.2d at 1063-64. See text accompanying notes 38-42 supra.
See notes 28-35 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 51 & 52 and accompanying text supra.
See text accompanying notes 65 & 66 supra.
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CUSTODY OF ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR TREATMENT AND SUPERVISION
MAY NOT BE CONFINED AMONG GENERAL POPULATION OF A FEDERAL
PENITENTIARY.

United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold (1978)
Conrad Dancy was convicted in the District of Columbia of first-degree
felony murder and carrying a pistol without a license.' Pursuant to the
provisions of the Federal Youth Corrections Act (YCA or Act),2 the trial
court committed Dancy to the Lorton Youth Center for study and evaluation
to determine if Dancy would benefit from a YCA sentence. 3 Relying on the
youth center's recommendation that Dancy receive an adult sentence, 4 the
trial court sentenced him to an adult term of imprisonment of twenty years
to life. 5
After the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
remanded the case for resentencing, 6 the trial court imposed a YCA sentence of twenty years. 7 To serve this sentence, Dancy was transferred from

1. United States v. Dancy, 510 F.2d 779, 780-81 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Dancy was also con-

victed of second-degree murder and attempted armed robbery, but the court vacated those
convictions on appeal. Id. at 781 n.6.
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5025 (1976).
3. 510 F.2d qt 781. The trial court relied upon § 5010(e) of the YCA, which provides:
If the court desires additional information as to whether a youth offender will derive
benefit from treatment under subsections (b) or (c) it may order that he be committed to
the custody of the Attorney General for observation and study at an appropriate classification center or agency. Within sixty days from the date of the order, or such additional
1 period as the court may grant, the Commission shall report to the court its findings.
18 U.S.C. § 5010(e) (1976).
Dancy was under 22 years of age at the time of his conviction, and therefore could be
treated as a youth under the YCA. United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold, 572 F.2d 107, 108
(3d Cir. 1978). See 18 U.S.C. § 5006(d) (1976).
4. 510 F.2d at 781. The trial judge indicated that since the youth center itself had been of
the opinion that it could not satisfy Dancy's needs, the only alternative under the YCA was an
adult sentence. See id. at 784.
5. United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold, 572 F.2d 107, 108 (3d Cir. 1978).
6. 510 F.2d at 786. In remanding the case for resentencing, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia noted that the trial judge had erroneously believed that he
had no alternative under the YCA and was thus forced to follow the youth center recommendation that Dancy be given an adult sentence. Id. at 785. The court specifically held that a trial
judge has the discretion under the YCA to sentence the youth offender to an adult term or a
youth term, and that the report from the youth center is merely an aid to the judge in exercising this discretion. Id. Moreover, the court noted that the recommendation of the youth center
might have been based upon erroneous information. Id. at 786.
7. 572 F.2d at 109. This sentence was imposed pursuant to § 5010(c) of the YCA, which
provides in pertinent part:

(285)
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the Lorton Youth Center to a federal reformatory," and then to the federal
penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. 9 Subsequently, Dancy applied for
a writ of habeas corpus to determine whether the provisions of the YCA
required that youths sentenced thereunder be segregated from adult prisoners.' 0 The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania found for the inmate and granted the relief requested."
On appeal,

If the court shall find that the youth offender may not be able to derive maximum benefit
from treatment by the Commission prior to the expiration of six years from the date of
conviction it may, in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise provided by law,
sentence the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and
supervision pursuant to this chapter for any further period that may be authorized by law
for the offense or offenses of which he stands convicted or until discharged by the Commission as provided in section 5017(d) of this chapter.
18 U.S.C. § 5010(c) (1976).
8, 572 F.2d at 109. The federal reformatory was located in Petersburg, Virginia. Id.
9. United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold, No. 75-1392, slip op. at 2 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 18,
1976), aff'd, 572 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1978). The officials at the Petersburg reformatory determined that Dancy was not suitable for that institution due to the seriousness of his offense and
his past criminal record. United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold, No. 75-1392, slip op. at 2
(M.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 1976). Dancy also received two misconduct reports while at the Petersburg
reformatory, but the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania concluded that his transfer to Lewisburg was not related to those incidents. Id. While Dancy was
in the Administrative Detention Unit at Petersburg awaiting transfer to another institution, he
requested that he be transferred back to the Lorton Youth Center, but the Assistant Director of
the Correctional Program Division in the Bureau of Prisons decided that Dancy should be
transferred to the medium security federal penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. Id. Lewisburg Penitentiary is designed for adults who require close supervision, and has no separate
housing or treatment facilities for YCA inmates. 572 F.2d at 109. Dancy thus received no
treatment different from that afforded adult prisoners. Id.
10. United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold, No. 75-1392, slip op. at 3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 18,
1976), aff'd, 572 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1978). The petition for the writ of habeas corpus was filed
pursuant to § 2241 and § 2243 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 & 2243 (1976). United
States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold, slip op. at 1 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 1976). Dancy alleged that
mandatory due process requirements were not complied with by federal prisor officials either in
his transfer from the Lorton Youth Center to the federal reformatory at Petersburg or from
Petersburg to Lewisburg. Id. In his petition, Dancy requested that he be returned to the
Lorton Youth Center. Id.
11. United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold, No. 75-1392, slip op. at 11 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 18,
1976), aff'd, 572 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1978). The district court ordered that Dancy be returned' to
Petersburg and be incarcerated there under the terms of his sentence. United States ex rel.
Dancy v. Arnold, No. 75-1392, slip op. at 11 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 1976). Specifically, the district
court found that the Petersburg facility was designed for youth offenders committed under the
YCA, and also provided a program and atmosphere conducive to the rehabilitation of young
adults, while the Lewisburg penitentiary was a medium security institution for adult offenders
who required close supervision and who could not be maintained at less secure institutions. Id. slip
op. at 9. The Lewisburg penitentiary was not found to be an institution which provided treatment, rehabilitative facilities, and programs consistent with the commands of the YCA. Id. slip
op. at 10.
In addition, the district court cited the United States Supreme Court decision in Montanye
v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976), for the proposition that "provided 'the conditions or degree of
confinement to which the prisoner is subjected are within the sentence imposed upon him and
not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not itself subject an
inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.' " United States ex rel. Dancy v.
Arnold No. 75-1392, slip op. at 4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 1976), quoting Montanye v. Haymes, 427
U.S. 236, 239 (1976) (emphasis supplied by district court). The district court concluded that
Dancy's confinement was not "within the sentence imposed upon him" in that it deprived him
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, 12
holding 13 that segregation of youth offenders from adult prisoners is mandated by the YCA. United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold, 572 F.2d 107 (3d
Cir. 1978).

The YCA, enacted in 1950,' a originated in a 1942 report by a subcommittee of the Judicial Conference of the United States studying the general
subject of punishment for crime.' 5 The subcommittee found that habitual
criminal tendencies were formed between the ages of sixteen to twentythree, and therefore the purpose of the bill was to "substitute for retributive
punishment methods of training and treatment designed to correct and pre-

vent antisocial tendencies of youth offenders," 16 and to provide federal

of the benefits of the YCA. United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold, No. 75-1392, slip op. at 10
(M.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 1976). Further, the district court concluded that the Attorney General
abused his discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b) (1976) by transferring Dancy to Lewisburg,
since Lewisburg was not a "suitable and appropriate place" of confinement within the meaning
of that provision. United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold, No. 75-1392, slip op. at 10 (M.D. Pa.
Oct. 18, 1976). For the text of § 4082(b), see note 13 infra.
12. The case was heard by Judges Gibbons and Van Dusen, and by District Judge Gerry.
Judge Gerry, a United States District Judge for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation, wrote the opinion.
13. The Third Circuit further held that the portion of the district court ruling which ordered
Dancy returned to the federal reformatory at Petersburg should be vacated since the Attorney
General has discretion under § 4082(b) of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b) (1976), to
place a youth offender in any institution in which he would receive treatment consistent with
the YCA. 572 F.2d at 114. The Attorney General's discretion to designate the place of confinement is defined by § 4082 of the Criminal Code as follows:
(a) A person convicted of an offense against the United States shall be committed, for
such term of imprisonment as the court may direct, to the custody of the Attorney
General of the United States, who shall designate the place of confinement where the
sentence shall be served.
(b) The Attorney General may designate as a place of confinement any available, suitable,
and appropriate institution or facility . . . and may at any time transfer a person from
one place to another.
18 U.S.C. § 4082(a), (b) (1976). However, the court necessarily held that the Attorney General's
discretion under § 4082(a) and (b), 18 U.S.C. § 4082(a), (b) (1976), is limited by the terms of
the YCA. 572 F.2d at 114. See notes 56-63 and accompanying text infra.
Furthermore, the YCA defines "treatment" as "corrective and preventive guidance and training designed to protect the public by correcting antisocial tendencies of youth offenders." 18
U.S.C. § 5006(f) (1976).
14. Federal Youth Corrections Act of 1950, ch. 1115, § 2, 64 Stat. 1085 (1950) (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976)).
15. See H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG.
SERv. 3983, 3984. The recommendations of the subcommittee were substantially embodied in
the final bill as enacted. Id. The members of this subcommittee of the Judicial Conference of
the United States consisted of Chief Judge Orie L. Phillips of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Judge John C. Collet of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, and Chief Judge Carroll L. Hincks of the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut. Id.
16. Id. at 3, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. at 3985. The courts are also in
unanimous agreement that this is the major purpose of the YCA. See, e.g., Dorszynski v.
United States, 418 U.S. 424, 433 (1974); Abernathy v. United States, 418 F.2d 288, 290 (5th
Cir. 1969); Brown v. Carlson, 431 F. Supp. 755, 765 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
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judges with a system of sentencing that would "promote the rehabilitation of
those who in the opinion of the sentencing judge show promise of becoming
useful citizens, and ...avoid the degenerative and needless transformation
of many of these young persons into habitual criminals." 17
To accomplish the goal of rehabilitating youthful offenders, Congress
contemplated that the Director of the Bureau of Prisons be "required to
designate, set aside, and adapt institutions and agencies under the control of
the Department of Justice for treatment." 18 Furthermore, Congress required that "Isiuch institutions and agencies are to be used only for the
treatment of youth offenders, so far as practicable; and youth offenders are to
be segregated from other offenders, and the classes of offenders are to be
segregated according to their needs for treatment." 19
The United States Supreme Court has viewed the purpose of the Act in
a similar manner. In Dorszynski v. United States,2 0 the Court noted that the

17. H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SEHV.
3983, 3983.
18. Id. at 3, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. at 3986.
19. Id. at 3-4, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. at 3986. The House analysis of
the proposed YCA bill substantially repeats §5011 of the YCA, which provides in pertinent part:
Committed youth offenders not conditionally released shall undergo treatment in institutions of maximum security, medium security, or minimum security types, including training schools, hospitals, farms, forestry and other agencies that will provide the essential
varieties of treatment. The Director shall from time to time designate, set aside, and
adapt institutions and agencies under the control of the Department of Justice for treatment. Insofar as practicable, such institutions and agencies shall be used only for treatment of committed youth offenders, and such youth offenders shall be segregated from
other offenders, and classes of committed youth offenders shall be segregated according to
their needs for treatment.
18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976). An important difference between the House analysis of the bill and
the final form in which the bill was enacted was the inclusion of a semi-colon after the phrase
"'so far as practicable" and before the phrase "and youth offenders are to be segregated from
other offenders" in the House analysis of the bill. The bill as enacted had no semi-colon there.
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976) with H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 3983, 3986. This leaves open the question of
whether the phrase "insofar as practicable" modifies the clause "such youth offenders shall be
segregated from other offenders." See notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text infra.
In addition, the system contemplated by Congress was modeled after the English Borstal
system. See H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE
CONG. SERv. 3983, 3987-89. The Borstal system was begun in England toward the end of the
19th century, following an 1894 study in which it was shown that an extremely large number of
youths between the ages of 16 and 21 emerged from the English prison system unchanged or in
worse condition than when they had entered. Id. at 4, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG.
SERV. at 3987. Many of those youths leaving the English prison system were shown to be
"habitual criminals." id. The Borstal system, which included 13 institutions by 1950, segregated
the youthful offenders from the adult offenders and established special rehabilitative programs
for the youths. Id. at 4-5, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERv. at 3987. A 1936 report
showed that only 8.1% of the "Borstal graduates" were serving sentences of imprisonment,
penal servitude, or preventive detention, which was a significantly smaller rate of recidivism
than for "non-Borstal graduates." Id. at 6, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. at 3989.
Moreover, the House Report noted that Texas, California, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts had enacted youth correction acts similar to the one proposed. Id. at 7, reprinted in
[1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. at 3989.
20. 418 U.S. 424 (1974). The precise issue addressed by the Court in Dorszynski was the
conditions under which a trial judge could appropriately sentence a youth to an adult sentence

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss2/6

26

Editors: Criminal Law

1978-1979]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

YCA was designed "to provide a better method for treating young offenders
convicted in federal courts in that vulnerable age bracket [16-22], to rehabilitate them and restore normal behavior patterns . . . . The objective of these
[sentencing] options represented a departure from traditional sentencing,
and focused primarily on correction and rehabilitation." 21 The Supreme
Court further noted that "an integral part of the treatment program was the
segregation of the committed persons, insofar as practicable, so as to place
them with those similarly committed, to avoid the influence of association
22
with the more hardened inmates serving traditional criminal sentences."
Federal courts, however, disagree on whether youths sentenced under
the YCA must be placed in such a segregated facility. 2 3 In Harvin v.
United States,2 4 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia became the first court to hold that a youth convicted of a mis-

under the YCA. Id. at 425. The Supreme Court held that § 5010(d) of the YCA required an
explicit "no benefit" finding by the trial judge before he could impose an adult sentence on a
youth otherwise eligible for a YCA sentence. Id. at 443-44. See 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d) (1976). The
issue decided in Dorszynski must be distinguished from that involved in Dancy-whether a
youth, once sentenced under the YCA, must be segregated from adult prisoners in an institution
which provides YCA facilities and treatment. 572 F.2d at 108. See text accompanying notes
38-55 infra.
21. 418 U.S. at 433. For a list of the various sentencing options, see 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a)-(e)
(1976).
22. 418 U.S. at 433.
23. See notes 24-37 and accompanying text infra. Although the courts are split over the
issue of whether segregation of youth offenders sentenced under the YCA is mandated by the
YCA, the courts which have considered the issue are unanimous in upholding the constitutionality of the YCA against due process and equal protection attacks despite the fact that a youth
sentenced under the YCA could receive a longer sentence than an adult who committed the
same offense. See 572 F.2d at 110-11. In sustaining the constitutionality of the YCA, the federal
courts have determined that the rehabilitation aspects of a YCA sentence serve as the quid pro
quo for a longer confinement under different conditions than an adult prisoner would encounter. Id. at 111. See, e.g., Brisco v. United States, 368 F.2d 214, 215 (3d Cir. 1966); Rogers
v. United States, 326 F.2d 56, 57 (10th Cir. 1963); Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467,
472 (5th Cir. 1958). In the words of Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger:
[C]ommitment under the Youth Corrections Act may be longer than one year in cases of
misdemeanors, essentially because such confinement cannot be equated with incarceration
in an ordinary prison ....
[T]he clear language of the Act is that a court may, "in lieu of
the penalty of imprisonment otherwise provided by law," commit a convicted defendant
to the custody of Youth Correction authorities. This language is silent with respect to
limiting the number of years under the Act to the term ordinarily ordered for the particular crime in question. Actual confinement under the Youth Corrections Act may be
greater or may be less depending on many factors we cannot know or anticipate. But the
basic theory of the Act is rehabilitative and in a sense this rehabilitation may be regarded
as comprising the quid pro quo for a longer confinement but under different conditions
and terms than a defendant would undergo in an ordinary prison.
Carter v. United States, 306 F.2d 283, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
The Third Circuit raised this point because the confinement of a youth sentenced under
the YCA would negate the quid pro quo rationale of that law if the confinement were identical
to that which an adult would undergo, and thus raise serious doubts about its constitutionality.
572 F.2d at 111.
24. 445 F..2d 675 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971).
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demeanor under the YCA could not be confined in a federal penitentiary. 25
The court reasoned that the YCA limited sentences to institutions where the
confinement would be consistent with the rehabilitative purposes of the Act,
27
thus eliminating a federal penitentiary. 26 Moreover, in Brown v. Carlson,
the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin held
that all YCA offenders in confinement must be distributed within a segregated network of institutions that provide the essential types of treatment
required by the YCA. 2 '

The Brown court construed the phrase "insofar as

practicable" in the "treatment" section of the YCA 29 to mean that the
Bureau of Prisons was free to depart from the statutory norm of segregation
only when unforeseen and unusual circumstances so required, and then only
30

for as long as necessary.
Conversely, a majority of federal courts which have considered this
issue have reached a contrary result.31 In Abernathy v. United States,32 for
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit maintained
that the Attorney General was empowered, 33 notwithstanding the YCA, to
designate the place of confinement of any federal prisoner committed to his
custody, even though the place of confinement provided no separate YCA
treatment facilities.3

4

The United States District Court for the Southern

District of Indiana reached the same conclusion in Coats v. Markley3 5 by
analogizing the YCA to the Federal Juvenile Deliquency Act (JDA),3 6 under
which a youth could be confined in the general population of a federal
37
penitentiary.
Confronted with these conflicting decisions 3 the Dancy court found
support in the legislative history for its determination that youth offenders
25. 445 F.2d at 681-82.
26. Id. at 682. The D.C. Circuit extended the Harvin ruling to include felony convictions
under the YCA. See United States v. Howard, 449 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
27. 431 F. Supp. 755 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
28. Id. at 772.
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976). For the text of § 5011, see note 19 supra.
30. 431 F. Supp. at 773. The Brown court gave as an example of unforeseen and unusual
circumstances the situation where the number of YCA offenders requiring confinement under
maximum security conditions is extremely small. Id. Because of practical considerations such as
costs, the Bureau of Prisons would be free to house them in existing maximum security institutions in which non-YCA offenders are also housed, provided that within such maximum security
institutions the YCA offenders are segregated from the other offenders. Id.
31. See, e.g., Barr v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 990, 996 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Foote v.
United States, 306 F. Supp. 627, 628 (D. Nev. 1969); United States v. Reef, 268 F. Supp.
1015, 1017 (D. Colo. 1967) (dictum).
32. 418 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1969).
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 4082(a), (b) (1976). For the text of these sections, see note 13 supra.
34. 418 F.2d at 289.
35. 200 F. Supp. 686 (S.D. Ind. 1962). For a discussion of the validity of the reasoning
employed in Coats, see text accompanying notes 51-55 infra.
36. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (1976). See notes 51-55 and accompanying text infra.
37. 200 F. Supp. at 687.
38. See notes 23-37 and accompanying text supra. The Dancy court agreed with that portion of the Harvin decision which held that youth offenders cannot, consistent with the Act's
rehabilitative purposes, be placed among adult prisoners in a federal penitentiary. 572 F.2d at
112. The Third Circuit, however, disagreed with the Harvin court's conclusion. that a youth
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sentenced under the YCA must be segregated from adult prisoners.3 9 The
court primarily focused on the proposition that the purpose of the Act was
rehabilitation of youth offenders, and that confinement of youth offenders
with adult offenders was inconsistent with this rehabilitative purpose. 40 The
court noted that the report to the Judicial Conference, 41 which was substantially adopted by Congress, contemplated a system in which committed
youth offenders would be separated from adult prisoners without excep42
tion.
In addition, the Dancy court construed the legislative intent underlying
the YCA to be similar to the philosophical approach adopted by the Borstal
system, an English youth offender program which closely parallels the
YCA. 43 Specifically, the court noted that the purpose of both the Borstal
system and the YCA was to insure that youth offenders were separated from
the corruptive influence of adult criminals. 44 The Dancy court reasoned
that the legislature intended to accomplish the complete segregation of
youth offenders from adult offenders, 45 and therefore concluded that the
placement of a youth offender in the general population of a federal peniten46
tiary conflicted with the statutory scheme and purpose of Congress.
sentenced pursuant to the YCA could never be placed within the walls of a federal penitentiary,
even if that penitentiary had separate YCA facilities. Id. at 113 n.9. The court noted that § 5011 of
the YCA, 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976), specifically authorized maximum security confinement, and the
Dancy court thus believed that a youth offender facility could be established within the walls of
a federal penitentiary if it otherwise complied with the treatment and segregation requirements
of the YCA. 572 F.2d at 113 n.9.
39. 572 F.2d at 110-13. The court here noted the ambiguity in the language of the "treatment" section of the YCA, 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976), and concluded that since the section was
susceptible to more than one meaning, it was imperative to examine the purpose and history of
the legislation. 572 F.2d at 110, citing United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973, 977 n.9
(D.D.C. 1971). For the text of § 5011, see note 19 supra. See also Brown v. Carlson, 431 F.
Supp. 755, 769-73 (W.D. Wis. 1977) ("insofar as practicable" modifies only "such institutions
and agencies shall be used only for the treatment of committed youth offenders").
40. 572 F.2d at 112. The Supreme Court in Dorszynski made it clear that the purpose of
the YCA was the rehabilitation of youth offenders. 418 U.S. at 433. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra.
41. REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON PUNISHMENT FOR
CRIME 1, 2 (1942).

42. 572 F.2d at 112. The House report made it clear that the recommendations of the

Judicial Conference were embodied in the YCA bill. H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
2, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 3983, 3984.
43. 572 F.2d at 112. See H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7, reprinted in [1950]
U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 3983, 3987-89. For a discussion of the Borstal system, see note 19
supra.
44. 572 F.2d at 112.
45. Id. In reaching the result, the Dancy court interpreted the phrase "insofar as practicable" in the treatment section of the YCA as modifying the clause "such institutions and agencies
shall be used only for treatment of youth offenders." Id. at 113, See 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976).
For the text of § 5011, see note 19 supra.
46. 572 F.2d at 113. The court also rejected the argument that they should defer to the
Bureau of Prisons' interpretation of the YCA to the extent that the Bureau believed that the
YCA requires segregation of youth offenders only insofar as segregation is practicable, and that
they may assign youth offenders to adult institutions in appropriate situations. Id. The Third
Circuit noted that it was "not bound to accept an administrative construction of a statute which
is at odds with a congressional intent and statutory policy which has been plainly expressed."
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The Third Circuit summarily rejected the line of cases 47 which held
that the Attorney General is authorized 4 to confine a youth sentenced
under the YCA to a federal penitentiary without separate youth treatment
facilities. 49 The Dancy court based its rejection of those cases on the failure
of those courts to fully consider the purpose and legislative intent of the
Act .5 0 The court also distinguished a series of cases 51 which held that 5a2
juvenile committed to the custody of the Attorney General under the JDA
may be confined in a federal penitentiary, 53 noting that those cases were
decided prior to a 1974 amendment to the JDA which provided that
juveniles could not be confined in adult jails and institutions in which they
would have regular contact with adult criminals. 54 The Dancy court concluded that this amendment demonstrated a continuing congressional intent
to segregate youth offenders from adult criminals, thus further substantiating
55
its construction of the YCA.

The Dancy court's extreme reliance on the legislative history of the
YCA to limit the discretion of the Attorney General in designating a place of
confinement for a person sentenced under the YCA was unnecessary, since
there is express support for this position in the language of the statute. The
Criminal Code provides that "the Attorney General may designate as a place
of confinement any available, suitable, and appropriate institution or facility." 56 According to the YCA, however, "suitable and appropriate" facilities

Id. The United States Supreme Court has also engaged in considerable discussion concerning the
extent to which a reviewing court must defer to the administrative interpretation of the agency.
Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 443-44 (1971); United States v. City of
Chicago, 400 U.S. 8, 10 (1970) with Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973);
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969).
47. For a discussion of these cases, see notes 31-37 and accompanying text supra.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b) (1976). For the text of § 4082(b), see note 13 supra.
49. 572 F.2d at 111-12.
50. Id. at 112. The Dancy court also noted that in all but one of those contrary decisions the
federal habeas corpus petitioner was acting pro se without the benefit of competent counsel. Id.
at 112 n.6.
51. See Sonnenberg v. Markley, 289 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1961); Arkadiele v. Markley, 186 F.
Supp. 586 (S.D. Ind. 1960); United States v. McCoy, 150 F. Supp. 237, 239 (M.D. Pa. 1957).
The Government contended that it would be anomalous for a juvenile to be committed to
the general population of a federal penitentiary, while an older youth sentenced under the YCA
could not be. 572 F.2d at 113-14. Within the provisions of the JDA, a juvenile is a
person who has not attained his eighteenth birthday, or for the purpose of proceedings
and disposition under this chapter for an alleged act of juvenile delinquency, a person
who has not attained his twenty-first birthday, and "juvenile delinquency" is the violation
of a law of the United States committed by a person prior to his eighteenth birthday
which would have been a crime if committed by an adult.
18 U.S.C. § 5031 (1976).
The YCA provides that a youth is a person under the age of 22 at the time of conviction.
Id. § 5006(d).
52. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (1976).
53. 572 F.2d at 113-14.
54. Id. at 114. See Amendments to Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act of Sept. 7, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-415, § 509, 88 Stat. 1138 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 5039 (1976)).
55. 572 F.2d at 114.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b) (1976). For the text of § 4082(b), see note 13 supra.
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must provide the specialized treatment required by that statute.5 7 Under
accepted rules of statutory construction, the broad discretion vested in the
Attorney General by the Criminal Code is limited by the later enacted YCA,
which was addressed to a specific subclass of federal offenders. 58
Moreover, the YCA assigns to the sound discretion of the trial judge the
question of whether a youth offender should be sentenced under the Act. 59
Since a YCA sentence is distinguishable from an adult sentence, 60 allowing
the Attorney General to confine the YCA sentenced youth in a nonsegregated federal penitentiary would effectively destroy the rehabilitative treatment contemplated by the legislature. 6 1 Similarly, unlimited authority in
the Attorney General would nullify the discretion vested in the trial judge to
determine the type of sentence. 62 To permit either result would render the
YCA meaningless and thereby ignore the congressional purpose in enacting
63
the statute.
The Dancy decision undoubtedly furthers the purpose of the YCA as
reflected in its legislative history. 64 It is clear that in enacting "the most
comprehensive federal statute concerned with sentencing," 65 the primary
57. 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976). For the text of § 5011, see note 19 supra. The statute specifically provides that "[c]ommitted youth offenders not conditionally released shall undergo treatment in institutions . . . that will provide the essential varieties of treatment." 18 U.S.C. § 5011
(1976). See also United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold, No. 75-1392, slip op. at 10 (M.D. Pa.
Oct. 18, 1976) (Lewisburg Penitentiary not a "'suitable and appropriate place" within meaning of
YCA).
58. Brown v. Carlson, 431 F. Supp. 755, 770 (W.D. Wis. 1977). It is a general rule that
separate statutory privisions relating to the same subject should be construed together as though
they constituted one law, even though they were enacted at different times and contain no
reference to one another. See, e.g., NLRB v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 179-80
(1967); Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 289 (1953); United States v. Stewart, 311
U.S. 60, 64 (1940).
59. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 441-43 (1974). Section 5010(d) of the YCA
provides that "[i]f the court shall find that the youth offender will not derive benefit from
treatment under subsection (b) or (c), then the court may sentence the youth offender under
any other applicable penalty provision." 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d) (1976).
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976). For the text of § 5011, see note 19 supra. See also 18
U.S.C. § 5010(c) (1976). For the text of § 5010(c), see note 7 supra.The Dancy court noted that
in order for the YCA's constitutionality to be sustained, the treatment afforded to a youth must
be distinguishable from that afforded to an adult. 572 F.2d at 111. See note 23 supra.
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 5006(f) (1976). For the text of § 5006 (f), see note 13 supra. See text
accompanying notes 39-46 supra.
62. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 441-44 (1974). The Dorszynski Court
found that the discretion granted to the trial judge in sentencing persons under the YCA was
beyond review by the appellate court. Id. at 441. Rather than constituting a substantive standard which would be subject to review, the "no benefit" determination is final with a trial
court. Id. at 441-42. The Court concluded that "[i]f the failure of a court to sentence a particular youth offender under the Act appears 'too harsh, the remedy must be afforded by act of
Congress, not by judicial legislation under the guise of construction,' " because this is a question of congressional policy. Id. at 442, quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305
(1932). It seems apparent, therefore, that if a trial judge detdrmines that a youth offender
should be sentenced under the YCA, that decision should be afforded the same deference by
the Attorney General as is given by an appellate court.
63. See notes 39-46 and accompanying text supra.
64. See text accompanying notes 15-19 supra.
65. 418 U.S. at 432; United States v. Coefield, 476 F.2d 1152, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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purpose of Congress was the rehabilitation of youth offenders before they
became "habitual criminals." 6 6 A crucial aspect of the congressional scheme
was to place YCA sentenced youths with those similarly committed, and to
thus avoid all associations with hardened adult inmates. 67 The Dancy court,
therefore, properly concluded that confinement of youths sentenced under
the YCA with the general population of a federal penitentiary would defeat
the explicit congressional plan for preventing the development of hardened
68
criminals.
The resolution of the question of discretion concerning location of confinement has left unanswered the critical problem of what should happen to
the youth who was convicted of a very serious crime, sentenced under the
YCA, and then continues to act in an antisocial manner while confined.
Since a trial judge has determined that a YCA sentence was appropriate, the
only alternative under the YCA appears to be confinement in a maximum or
medium security institution which provides separate facilities and treatment
for YCA offenders. 69 Few, if any, such facilities exist, 70 however, and until
such facilities are created, some federal courts may continue to permit the
Attorney General to determine the facility.
The Dancy decision indicates that the policy considerations underlying
the YCA, as outlined in its legislative history, 71 should be given primary
consideration in its construction. 72 The Third Circuit satisfactorily distinguished contrary cases 73 based on different criteria. 74 If effectuation of this
policy is to become a reality, however, more YCA facilities equipped to
meet the particular needs of youth offenders must be established. 75 This is
a problem to which Congress or the Federal Bureau of Prisons must respond
if the objective of the YCA is to be met.
David W. Rayment
66. 418 U.S. at 432-33; H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1950]
U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 3983, 3985.
67. 418 U.S. at 434.
68. See 572 F.2d at 113; notes 16 & 17 and accompanying text supra. In so deciding, the
Dancy court relied upon the statutory definition of "treatment." 572 F.2d at 113. The YCA
defines treatment as "corrective and preventive guidance and training designed to protect the
public by correcting the antisocial tendencies of youth offenders." 18 U.S.C. § 5006(f) (1976).
Furthermore, in relying upon the legislative history of the YCA, the Dancy court appropriately distinguished prior contrary decisions. 572 F.2d at 111-12. See notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra. As the court pointed out, none of those courts discussed the scope and
purpose of the YCA. 572 F.2d at 112. In addition, those decisions which analogized to the JDA
are no longer pertinent since the JDA has been amended to restrict the Attorney General's
authority in designating places of confinement for juveniles. See 18 U.S.C. § 5039 (1976). See
also notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra.
69. See 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976). For text of § 5011, see note 19 supra.
70. Brown v. Carlson, 431 F. Supp. 755, 767-73 (W.D. Wis. 1977). This problem was manifested in Dancy, since Lewisburg had no separate YCA facilities. 572 F.2d at 109. See note 9
0
supra.
71. See text accompanying notes 15-19 supra.
72. See notes 38-46 and accompanying text supra.
73. See notes 47-50 & 68 and accompanying text supra.
74. See notes 31-37 and accompanying text supra.
75. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss2/6

32

